The decision maker shall evaluate its exposure relative to the total variability of returns of the investee. This evaluation is made primarily on the basis of returns expected from the activities of the investee but shall not ignore the decision maker’s maximum exposure to variability of returns of the investee through other interests that the decision maker holds.
Example 13 A decision maker (fund manager) establishes, markets and
manages a publicly traded, regulated fund according to narrowly
defined parameters set out in the investment mandate as required
by its local laws and regulations. The fund was marketed to
investors as an investment in a diversified portfolio of equity
securities of publicly traded entities. Within the defined
parameters, the fund manager has discretion about the assets in
which to invest. The fund manager has made a 10 per cent pro
rata investment in the fund and receives a market-based fee for its
services equal to 1 per cent of the net asset value of the fund. The
fees are commensurate with the services provided. The fund
manager does not have any obligation to fund losses beyond its
10 per cent investment. The fund is not required to establish, and
has not established, an independent board of directors. The
investors do not hold any substantive rights that would affect the
decision-making authority of the fund manager, but can redeem
their interests within particular limits set by the fund.
Although operating within the parameters set out in the investment
mandate and in accordance with the regulatory requirements, the
fund manager has decision-making rights that give it the current
ability to direct the relevant activities of the fund-the investors do
not hold substantive rights that could affect the fund manager's
decision-making authority. The fund manager receives a market-based fee for its services that is commensurate with the services
Provisoprovided and has also made a pro rata investment in the fund.
The remuneration and its investment expose the fund manager to
variability of returns from the activities of the fund without creating
exposure that is of such significance that it indicates that the fund
In this example, consideration of the fund manager's exposure to
variability of returns from the fund together with its decision-making authority within restricted parameters indicates that the
fund manager is an agent. Thus, the fund manager concludes that it does not control the fund.
A decision maker establishes, markets and manages a fund that
provides investment opportunities to a number of investors. The
decision maker (fund manager) must make decisions in the best
interests of all investors and in accordance with the fund's
governing agreements. Nonetheless, the fund manager has wide
decision-making discretion. The fund manager receives a market-based fee for its services equal to 1 per cent of assets under
management and 20 per cent of all the fund's profits if a specified
profit level is achieved. The fees are commensurate with the
Although it must make decisions in the best interests of all
investors, the fund manager has extensive decision-making
authority to direct the relevant activities of the fund. The fund
manager is paid fixed and performance-related fees that are
commensurate with the services provided. In addition, the
remuneration aligns the interests of the fund manager with those
of the other investors to increase the value of the fund, without
creating exposure to variability of returns from the activities of the
fund that is of such significance that the remuneration, when
considered in isolation, indicates that the fund manager is a
The above fact pattern and analysis applies to examples 14A-14C
described below. Each example is considered in isolation.
The fund manager also has a 2 per cent investment in the fund
that aligns its interests with those of the other investors. The fund
manager does not have any obligation to fund losses beyond its 2
per cent investment. The investors can remove the fund manager
by a simple majority vote, but only for breach of contract.
The fund manager's 2 per cent investment increases its exposure
to variability of returns from the activities of the fund without
creating exposure that is of such significance that it indicates that
the fund manager is a principal. The other investors' rights to
remove the fund manager are considered to be protective rights
because they are exercisable only for breach of contract. In this
example, although the fund manager has extensive decision-making authority and is exposed to variability of returns from its
interest and remuneration, the fund manager's exposure indicates
that the fund manager is an agent. Thus, the fund manager
concludes that it does not control the fund.
The fund manager has a more substantial pro rata investment in
the fund, but does not have any obligation to fund losses beyond
that investment. The investors can remove the fund manager by a
simple majority vote, but only for breach of contract.
In this example, the other investors' rights to remove the fund
manager are considered to be protective rights because they are
exercisable only for breach of contract. Although the fund manager
is paid fixed and performance-related fees that are commensurate
with the services provided, the combination of the fund manager's
investment together with its remuneration could create exposure to
variability of returns from the activities of the fund that is of such
significance that it indicates that the fund manager is a principal.
The greater the magnitude of, and variability associated with, the
fund manager's economic interests (considering its remuneration
and other interests in aggregate), the more emphasis the fund
manager would place on those economic interests in the analysis,
and the more likely the fund manager is a principal.
For example, having considered its remuneration and the other
factors, the fund manager might consider a 20 per cent investment
to be sufficient to conclude that it controls the fund. However, in
different circumstances (ie if the remuneration or other factors are
different), control may arise when the level of investment is
The fund manager has a 20 per cent pro rata investment in the
fund, but does not have any obligation to fund losses beyond its 20
per cent investment. The fund has a board of directors, all of
whose members are independent of the fund manager and are
appointed by the other investors. The board appoints the fund
manager annually. If the board decided not to renew the fund
manager's contract, the services performed by the fund manager
could be performed by other managers in the industry.
Although the fund manager is paid fixed and performance-related fees that are commensurate with the services provided, the
combination of the fund manager's 20 per cent investment together
with its remuneration creates exposure to variability of returns from
the activities of the fund that is of such significance that it indicates
that the fund manager is a principal. However, the investors have
substantive rights to remove the fund manager-the board of
directors provides a mechanism to ensure that the investors can
remove the fund manager if they decide to do so.
In this example, the fund manager places greater emphasis on the
substantive removal rights in the analysis. Thus, although the fund
manager has extensive decision-making authority and is exposed
to variability of returns of the fund from its remuneration and
investment, the substantive rights held by the other investors
indicate that the fund manager is an agent. Thus, the fund manager
concludes that it does not control the fund.
An investee is created to purchase a portfolio of fixed rate asset-backed securities, funded by fixed rate debt instruments and equity
instruments. The equity instruments are designed to provide first
loss protection to the debt investors and receive any residual
returns of the investee. The transaction was marketed to potential
debt investors as an investment in a portfolio of asset-backed
securities with exposure to the credit risk associated with the
possible default of the issuers of the asset-backed securities in the
portfolio and to the interest rate risk associated with the
management of the portfolio. On formation, the equity instruments
represent 10 per cent of the value of the assets purchased. A
decision maker (the asset manager) manages the active asset
portfolio by making investment decisions within the parameters set
out in the investee's prospectus. For those services, the asset
manager receives a market-based fixed fee (ie 1 per cent of assets
under management) and performance-related fees (ie 10 per cent
of profits) if the investee's profits exceed a specified level. The fees
are commensurate with the services provided. The asset manager
holds 35 per cent of the equity in the investee. The remaining 65
per cent of the equity, and all the debt instruments, are held by a
large number of widely dispersed unrelated third party investors.
The asset manager can be removed, without cause, by a simple
majority decision of the other investors.
The asset manager is paid fixed and performance-related fees that
are commensurate with the services provided. The remuneration
aligns the interests of the fund manager with those of the other
investors to increase the value of the fund. The asset manager has
exposure to variability of returns from the activities of the fund
because it holds 35 per cent of the equity and from its
Although operating within the parameters set out in the investee's
prospectus, the asset manager has the current ability to make
investment decisions that significantly affect the investee's
returns-the removal rights held by the other investors receive little
weighting in the analysis because those rights are held by a large
number of widely dispersed investors. In this example, the asset
manager places greater emphasis on its exposure to variability of
returns of the fund from its equity interest, which is subordinate to
the debt instruments. Holding 35 per cent of the equity creates
subordinated exposure to losses and rights to returns of the
investee, which are of such significance that it indicates that the
asset manager is a principal. Thus, the asset manager concludes
that it controls the investee.
A decision maker (the sponsor) sponsors a multi-seller conduit,
which issues short-term debt instruments to unrelated third party
investors. The transaction was marketed to potential investors as
an investment in a portfolio of highly rated medium-term assets
with minimal exposure to the credit risk associated with the
possible default by the issuers of the assets in the portfolio.
Various transferors sell high quality medium-term asset portfolios
to the conduit. Each transferor services the portfolio of assets that
it sells to the conduit and manages receivables on default for a
market-based servicing fee. Each transferor also provides first loss
protection against credit losses from its asset portfolio through
over-collateralisation of the assets transferred to the conduit.
The sponsor establishes the terms of the conduit and manages the
operations of the conduit for a market-based fee. The fee is
commensurate with the services provided. The sponsor approves
the sellers permitted to sell to the conduit, approves the assets to
be purchased by the conduit and makes decisions about the
funding of the conduit. The sponsor must act in the best interests of all investors.
The sponsor is entitled to any residual return of the conduit and
also provides credit enhancement and liquidity facilities to the
conduit. The credit enhancement provided by the sponsor absorbs
losses of up to 5 per cent of all of the conduit's assets, after losses
are absorbed by the transferors. The liquidity facilities are not
advanced against defaulted assets. The investors do not hold
substantive rights that could affect the decision-making authority of
Even though the sponsor is paid a market-based fee for its
services that is commensurate with the services provided, the
sponsor has exposure to variability of returns from the activities of
the conduit because of its rights to any residual returns of the
conduit and the provision of credit enhancement and liquidity
facilities (ie the conduit is exposed to liquidity risk by using short-term debt instruments to fund medium-term assets). Even though
each of the transferors has decision-making rights that affect the
value of the assets of the conduit, the sponsor has extensive
decision-making authority that gives it the current ability to direct
the activities that most significantly affect the conduit's returns (ie
the sponsor established the terms of the conduit, has the right to
make decisions about the assets (approving the assets purchased
and the transferors of those assets) and the funding of the conduit
(for which new investment must be found on a regular basis)). The
right to residual returns of the conduit and the provision of credit
enhancement and liquidity facilities expose the sponsor to
variability of returns from the activities of the conduit that is
different from that of the other investors. Accordingly, that
exposure indicates that the sponsor is a principal and thus the
sponsor concludes that it controls the conduit. The sponsor's
obligation to act in the best interest of all investors does not
prevent the sponsor from being a principal.
Relationship with other parties
B73 When assessing control, an investor shall consider the nature of its relationship with other parties and whether those other parties are acting on the investor’s behalf (ie they are ‘de facto agents’). The determination of whether other parties are acting as de facto agents requires judgement, considering not only the nature of the relationship but also how those parties interact with each other and the investor.
B74 Such a relationship need not involve a contractual arrangement. A party is a de facto agent when the investor has, or those that direct the activities of the investor have, the ability to direct that party to act on the investor’s behalf. In these circumstances, the investor shall consider its de facto agent’s decision-making rights and its indirect exposure, or rights, to variable returns through the de facto agent together with its own when assessing control of an investee.
B75 The following are examples of such other parties that, by the nature of their relationship, might act as de facto agents for the investor: